MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL'S MONOPOLY POWER AND THE NEGRO LEAGUES *ALFRED DENNIS MATHEWSON
Fifty years have passed since Branch Rickey lured Jackie Robinson from the Kansas City Monarchs to play for the Brooklyn Dodgers.
Nearly thirty years have passed since the Indianapolis Clowns, the last surviving Negro League team, closed its doors and ceased to play ball. Historians attribute this failure to integration. This article challenges that view. It is true that the very existence of teams of Black players (usually with Black owners) was due to the exclusion of Black players from "Organized Baseball."' The formation of the Negro Leagues also resulted from, but did not necessarily occur because of, the purposeful segregation of the Major Leagues. "heir establishment was driven by economics; team owners were trying to improve the quality of their product and profitability. Whatever the cause for their existence, the survival of organizations like the American Tennis Association (ATA), the Harlem Globetrotters and Black college sports in general demonstrates that the demise of the Negro Leagues was not an inevitable consequence of the Major Leagues' inclusion of Black players. and afler joining leagues. The Kansas City Monarchs, who introduced night baseball in 1930; and the Indianapolis Clowns were two of the most successful barnstorming teams.7
Any business firm, in order t o be successful, needs continuous relationships with employees, suppliers, landlords, financiers and owners. In the American economy, these relationships are reflected in various contractual arrangements that have been described as "relational contracts," because they provide for or establish a framework for a set of transactions over time.' Professional baseball, whether involving barnstorming or otherwise, requires relational contracts with other teams and arena owners, financiers and players. Contrary t o popular connotations, the relational contract structure of the barnstorming operations of Negro teams was quite organized. Arrangements among teams and facility operators were made through a system of booking agents at least one year in a d~a n c e .~
The reliability of the booking agent system, however, did not mean that the arrangements were not costly. For Negro teams, scheduling of barnstorming games posed other problems. The teams confronted obstacles in obtaining suitable playing facilities.
In Modern Amusements, Inc. u. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.," for example, a booking agent arranged for games between two Negro teams with the lessee of a baseball park. A fight occurred during the first game which required police involvement. The park was located in a White neighborhood and the lessor responded to the altercation by invoking a clause in the lease requiring the lessee t o observe "all rules and regulations prescribed by the lessor."" Specifically, the lessor issued a regulation prohibiting any more games in the park between Negro teams. The court upheld the regulation but explained: Some teams rented Major League stadiums for their own games and played when the Major League team was not in town. The use of facilities by Negro teams also surfaced in a rent dispute between the St.
Louis Cardinals and their landlord. The Cardinals unsuccessfully asserted that they were entitled to an offset for the use of the lighting system jointly owned by the Cardinals and the St. Louis Browns during "Negro exhibition games."13 The likely ultimate effect was an increase in the rent charged to Negro teams. The practice of renting Major League facilities continued after the Negro League era. Some teams apparently constructed and owned their own fa~i1ities.l~ Not only did Negro teams have to face arenas which were off limits due t o stereotypical fears,15 they also had to find places t o play with segregated seating. Satchel Paige refused to pitch in the Kansas City stadium unless the segregated seating restrictions were removed during Negro League games.I6 Players also encountered segregated accommodations while traveling. l7 Teams also faced tort liability from which White clubs were not immune. la In some cases, however, the lawsuits were filed against the owners or regular lessee of the parks. Even though the teams may not have been sued, such suits no doubt raised the cost of renting stadiums for them. Consequently, Negro League teams faced the daunting task of playing numerous away games to increase revenue and incurring additional costs in the process. The additional costs left less money to pay the players to compete in an integrated players' market.
Despite the profitability of barnstorming, it did not offer the quality of product and growth potential of league sport. This observation is amply demonstrated by the history of the Harlem G10betrotters.l~ l3 Dodier Realty & Inv. Co. v. St. Louis Nat'l Baseball Club, Inc., 238 S.W.2d 321, 325 (Mo. 1951) . l4 The Memphis Red Sox owned their stadium, Martin Park, but were one of the few teams to do so. 
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We have players who can bat and players who can field. We have players who can pitch and who can run, we have magnates with the glad hand, also the baseball fan; we have coaches who can make a lot of fun. We have umpires, we have scribes, the latter to criticize; we have cranks and also enthusiasts; but of all this, the one we need most is the man who will say, 'Let's organize.' Big leagues all have grounds and players of wide renown; they have their Wagners and their Crawfords and their Stahls; they have magnates with money to burn and others eager to earn. They are organized and that's the best of all. They've got us on the run in this game, more work than fun. This fact, no doubt you have surmised, so while running in this race, why not keep up with the pace? Get together and proceed to organize.
The importance of this plea sooner or later you11 surely see, that it's timely and directed a t the right place; so while you have the chance, accept opportunities to advance and uphold the rapid progress of our race. The game is honest, the game is square, a point we all declare, so we need not dwell on that at any length; h m out of our slumber let us arise and treat our friends to a grand s u r p r i s e b e up and doing! Let's organize. Although the Negro Leagues provided organization, they lacked strong relational contract structures.30 The production of league sport requires two distinct layers of relational contracts.3l First, team owners must associate to form the league, establish league objectives and design the league product. Each owner then must enter into a second layer of contracts with players, stadium landlords, financiers and suppliers. In the league, each team owner is subject to the viability of the second layer of contracts of other team owners. This structure contrasts with barnstorming sport, under which the first layer was established through booking agents, and individual teams were not dependent upon the second layer structures of other teams. If a team failed, a barnstorming team could simply line up another team through the booking agent.
The relational contracts among owners were weak in the Negro Leagues. Teams were not committed exclusively t o playing in the league, but continued to engage in barnstorming with non-league teams as gate receipts provided the largest source of revenue. [Lajoie] is an expert baseball player in any position; . . . he has a great reputation as a second baseman; . . . that his withdrawal h m the team . . . would probably make a difference in the size of the audiences attending the game. . . . He has been for several years in the service of the plaintiff club. . . . He has become thoroughly familiar with the action and methods of the other players in the club, and his own work is peculiarly meritorious as an integral part of the team work which is so essential. . . . Lajoie is well known, and has great reputation among the patrons of the sport, for ability in the position which he filled, and was thus a most attractive drawing card for the public. He may not be the sun in the baseball firmament, but he is certainly a bright particular star.= The Major Leagues suppressed the price of that value through an extremely strong employment contract structure in the form of its legally protected reserve system. Once a player was drafted, he could contract to play only for that team or for a team to whom the drafting team assigned its rights. The player could not unilaterally choose t o play for any other team. A player who avoided the draft could contract with the team of his choice, but once he signed, he could play only for that team or a team to whom his contract was subsequently assigned. "he reserve system thus obviated the right of the player to choose his employer. It was this condition that Curt Flood found so unacceptably onerous that he was willing to give up an annual salary of $100,000 per year and his career in professional baseball.
The cultural attitude was reflected in Jackie Robinson's testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary in 1958. Six star players appeared before the Subcommittee, but Robinson was the only one who criticized the reserve system. I think they [players] should in some way be able to express themselves as to whether or not they want to play for a certain ball club. I am highly in favor of the reserve clause. I do not want to get this out that I don't believe there should be some control. But on the other hand, I don't think the owners should have all of the control. I think that there should be something that a ballplayer himself could say that would have some effect upon his particular position with a ball Robinson's concern was that the reserve system prevented players who were not stars from exercising choice so as to better their careers and value.46
Cultural attitudes on the freedom of workers to choose their employer also were reflected in the actions of Negro League owners once the Major Leagues started signing Black players. The owners of the Negro League teams were confronted with a quandary. On one hand, they did not want to stand in the way of the freedom of their players to better themselves, but on the other, they were fighting for their survival. Until the Robinson signing, the Negro Leagues lacked a reserve
In fact, many teams did not use written contracts until after Branch Rickey refused to pay compensation to the Kansas City '' Id. at 296. '' DIXON, supm note 4, at 88.
Monarchs after signing Jackie R~binson.~' J. L. Wilkinson, the owner of the Kansas City Monarchs, was famous for his handshake contracts, and Rickey cited the lack of a written contract as a reason for rehsing t o pay. He also cited the well known ties of several Negro League owners t o the numbers racket.48
In another famous incident, Effa Manley, the owner of the Newark Eagles, demanded compensation from the Dodgers, who wanted to sign Monte Irvin who was bound by a written contract:' Rickey responded by criticizing her publicly for standing in the way of the player.5o She refused to back down and received c~mpensation.~~ Thereafter, the Negro Leagues required a uniform player contract so that teams could receive compensation when their players were signed by Major League teams. The uniform player contract was thus not used to stifle player choice, but t o obtain compensation from the Major Leagues for the loss of a talented player. The Major Leagues eventually avoided the cost of buyouts from Negro League teams by recruiting Black players out of high school.52
One advantage of a league is the centralized scheduling of league games.63 It is a league expense paid by member clubs in some fashion. The Office of the Commissioner of Major League Baseball is funded by the Major League teams and one of its more thankless responsibilities is scheduling." The Negro Leagues, however, continued to use the booking agent system. When Rube Foster organized the Negro Leagues, he attempted to centralize this function and served as booking agent for the League for a controversial five percent fee.55
In addition to the weak contracts among owners, associational contracts among owners and the employment contracts with players, financial relationships provided limited access to capital resources. Some owners were individuals, like Bill "Bojangles" Robinson, who became wealthy from other business endeavors. Several owners had ties t o the numbers racket.56 At least one club tried raising h n d s through 
The American Tennis Association and Black Colleges
The extinction of the Negro Leagues in the post-integration era was consistent with the theories of some scholars of Black capitalism, most notably Andrew Brimmer, a former member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and now the chairman of the District of Columbia Financial Control Board. According to Brimmer, many Black firms benefited from, and indeed preferred, segregation because of the absence of competition from White firms!' Although White fans attended Negro League games, the teams faced virtually no competition from White firms in the market for Black baseball players. Brimmer's theory would predict that the Negro League teams would fail once better financed White firms, i.e., Major League Baseball teams, began competing in that market. The theory appears to predict the failure of the Negro Leagues as well.
Brimmer's theory, however, only explains the preference for segregated markets by Black-owned firms; it leads to the conclusion but does not explicitly hold that the demise of Black firms is an inevitable consequence of the integration of previously segregated Black markets. One reason the ATA may have survived, apart from the support of the civil rights community, is that it has had a continuing role in the nurturing and development of future African-American stars. Its programs expose African-Americans in urban areas and elsewhere to the game of tennis often using public facilities. Even Motown was assured a continuing place in the music industry firmament by access to young stars. The ATA also has another feature which it shares with historically Black colleges. Its programs are frequently tied t o definable African-American communities. Historically Black colleges and universities may be viewed as extensions of the communities from which their African-American students come, or a representation of a national community.
Abe Saperstein and the Globetrotters
Negro League teams were not the only professional sports organization featuring Black talent whose future was threatened in the post-integration era. The Harlem Globetrotters, although not Blackowned, offered the most prominent professional opportunity for Black basketball players until the Basketball Association of America, the forerunner of the National Basketball Association (NBA), integrated its player ranks in 1946.61 Arthur Ashe characterized the position of the Globetrotters in the market for Black professional basketball players in the early 1940s as a monopoly. This characterization, while inaccurate, comes close to describing their domination of that market. Unlike would-be owners of Major League franchises who failed to exploit the market of Black professional baseball players, Abe Saperstein acquired that market position by taking advantage of the bigotry of other White team owners who refused to deal with Black players. 
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However, the Globetrotters engaged in barnstorming and did not belong to a league. They made their money traveling the country and playing 150 to 170 games over a six to seven month season.62 Without significant league sport competition, the Globetrotters became the most popular professional basketball team in the world. The market position of the Globetrotters was threatened by the racial enlightenment of the owners of the NBA and its predecessors. The Globetrotters' domination of the market for professional Black players was over; they would now have to compete for the best players in that market. Indeed, the survival of the Globetrotters was jeopardized because much of their success was built upon a shortage in the supply of Black professional players resulting from their exclusion from white-owned teams. The advent of their inclusion on teams engaged in league sport led to an enhancement of the quality of the league product and a n increase in the supply of quality professional basketball product.
As the NBA's league sport gained in popularity, the fortunes of the Globetrotters declined.63 Abe Saperstein, the then owner of the Globetrotters responded to this challenge initially by cultivating a relationship with the NBA.64 In the early days of the NBA, the Globetrotters helped the league survive by scheduling games against NBA teams or in conjunction with their games.65 He also owned an interest in the Philadelphia Warriors, but that relationship soured after the Globetrotters defeated the Minneapolis Lakers and the NBA adopted an informal rule prohibiting member teams from playing the Globetrotters.s Saperstein and the NBA also had disagreements over his contributions to the NBA and game rules. The survival of the Globetrotters was jeopardized by the difficulty of retaining access to arenas in NBA cities and stiff competition for the best players.
Saperstein appears to have believed that the survival and success of the Globetrotters depended upon a symbiotic relationship with a professional league.67 He responded by founding the American Basketball League (ABL) as a rival to the NBA.s8 Although some Globetrotters were allowed to play in the new league, Saperstein did not cause the Globetrotters to become a team in the league.
The ABL failed, but more because of inadequate financing than due to the efforts of the NBA. Saperstein's hybrid league strategy thus failed because of the inability of his collaborators to obtain suitable relational contracts with other investors or financiers. The strategy had some chance to succeed because unlike the Negro Leagues, neither the Globetrotters nor the ABL confronted an NBA monopoly over the business of professional basketball or the market for professional players. In fact, the ABL was subsequently revived as the American Basketball Association, which ultimately merged with the NBA. The
Globetrotters appear to have survived because of another strategy with which Abe Saperstein is more commonly associated. He changed the game product of the Globetrotters from entertaining with a highly competitive basketball game to one involving the display of highly refined basketball skills and clowning. It was a strategy pursued by the Indianapolis Clowns that ultimately failed. Nevertheless, this product alteration appears to have been the strategy that most accounts for the survival of the Globetrotters. Today, they are the dominant supplier of this product and are Black-owned.
Black High School Athletic Associations
The case of Black high school athletic associations provides an example of Black institutions determined to survive integration in some fashion. The Virginia Interscholastic Association was formed by Black high schools apparently after Brown u. Board of Education was decided.69 The organizers explicitly formed it to provide leverage t o gain admittance to the all-White Virginia High School League (VHSL).70 One by one, its members joined the VHSL and in 1969, the two organizations merged.71 The association ceased to exist as an all-Black organization, but its members entered the White league as equals. In other states, efforts of Black high schools to attain membership in, or Black high school leagues to merge with White interscholastic associations resulted in litigati~n.~' Some Black high schools pursued the survival of their sports programs through a civil rights litigation strategy. In St. Augustine, a high school with an all-Black student body sought admission to the Louisiana High School Athletic Association (LHSAA), then comprised of high schools with integrated but formerly all-White student bodies. St. Augustine High School was a member of the Louisiana Interscholastic High School Athletic Association was comprised only of White schools and the Alabama Interscholastic Athletic Association was comprised of Black schools. Both associations had promulgated rules prohibiting its members from playing schools in the other association. The court found that the segregation of athletic activities discriminated against Black school^.^' Moreover, it found that the desegregation that had occurred by admitting Black athletes who had exercised their freedom of choice to play in the White association did not amount to de~egregation.~' Again, the parallels between the relationship of the Black high school association and the White association to that of the Negro Leagues and the Major Leagues is substantial. The court held that the unification of the two athletic associations by merger was required.79 The court went on to specify guidelines for the terms of the merger. Among others, it stated that if the Black association was abolished as a result of the merger, its executive director or its designee should be made an '' Macon County, 283 F. Supp. at 196-97. " The court described the effecta as follows: Alabama's dual athletic system has led to inadequate athletic programs in the various Negro schools. The Negro athletic association has not participated in the statewide tournaments and contests that are the prime source of revenue for the White athletic association. . . . This has resulted in inadequate financing of the athletic programs far the Negro schools. The dual system has resulted in a loss of recognition for athletes in the Negro schools-loss of recognition on both local and national levels. The National Federation of High School Athletic Associations recognizes only one association in Alabama: the Alabama High School Athletic Association.
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executive officer of the new association. It further specified that the administrative staff should be desegregated such that both associations held a significant number of positions on the governing board.'l The Black high school experience is interesting because the parallels of their experience to the relationship between the Negro Leagues and the Major Leagues are so strong. Segregated Black high school sports existed because of the exclusion of Black students from White schools. Black school sports faced the same danger of extinction as the Negro Leagues, but the civil rights litigation strategy contemplated the integration of institutions as well as student athletics. That strategy indicates that the concept of merger between Black and White sports organizations existed in the civil rights community even as the Negro Leagues faded into extinction. Perhaps, even if the Negro Leagues could not have survived as an independent league, Macon County suggests that one or more of their members-Black-owned teams-could have joined or been made a part of the Major Leagues. The possibility of a Negro League or Black-owned team joining the Major or minor leagues, however, does not appear to have been considered seriously since the F'ythian Club was denied entry into a league comprised of White teams in 1868."
The record is unclear about the thinking in the White world on the inclusion of the Negro League teams in leagues with White teams. Branch Rickey, for example, formed a club called the Brooklyn Brown Dodgers, which joined the United States Baseball League that Gus Greenlee organized after he left the Negro National League. It is widely believed that Rickey used the club as a subterfuge to scout Black players in anticipation of breaking the color barrier in the Major Leagues.= The USBL only lasted two months and there has been speculation about Rickey's true purpose.84
Other than Branch Rickey's failed experiment with the USBL, there does not appear to be any indication of the Major Leagues' interest in integrating ownership. The history of the Globetrotters may be illuminating on the interest of White owners in integrating Black teams into White leagues. One of the unanswered enigmas is why the Globetrotters did not become a team in the NBA or the ABL. Abe Saperstein did enjoy relational contracts with NBA team owners in the early years. The NBA managed to survive in the early years by arrangements between NBA owners and Sapertstein to schedule Globetrotter games in conjunction with NBA games." "he quid pro quo for Saperstein was the access of the Globetrotters to large arenas in NBA cities. Saperstein did, in fact, seek a franchise in the NBA. His estate maintained in Tax Court proceedings that his quest was unsuccessful because NBA owners insisted on a $250,000 franchise fee and he was unwilling to pay it."
The court opinion implies that he intended to maintain the Globetrotters as an independent organization and did not intend to make the Globetrotters a league team. But why not? If the Globetrotters could draw fans to NBA games by appearing on the same bill, would not their inclusion as a league member have strengthened the NBA? "he question is raised again with the formation of the ABL.
Saperstein, as its Commissioner, assigned some Globetrotter players to ABL teams, but again indicated that he intended to maintain the Globetrotters as an independent organization. The court did express disbelief at the assertion of the estate that he wanted to develop the Al3L as a farm league for the development of talent for the Globetrotters That disbelief rested on the court's view that such a relational contract was impractical. The question remains. Were the Globetrotters excluded from these leagues because of an unwillingness of White owners to include a team comprised solely of Black players? If the position of his estate is accepted, the answer is no. Given the racial norms of the era, it is plausible that race did play a significant role. If the Globetrotters were If survival of the Negro Leagues as a minor league or the entry of one or more Negro League teams were possible after integration, why did the leagues and the teams become extinct? The most likely culprit appears to have been the monopoly power of Major League Baseball.
The Reserve System and Monopoly Power
By 1914, at least one court had recognized that the Major Leagues had obtained a monopoly over the market for White professional players via the reserve system. In American League Baseball Club of Chicago u. Chase:2 a player signed a contract with a team in the Federal League while under contract to the Chicago White Sox of the American League. The court found that the Major Leagues had a monopoly over the business of baseball and refused to uphold an injunction preventing the player from playing for the Federal League team. The court stated that it would not assist in enforcing an agreement that was a "part of a general plan having for its object the maintenance of a monopoly, interference with the personal liberty of a citizen, and the control of his free right to labor wherever and for whom he pleases, and [would] not extend its aid to further the purposes and practices of an unlawful c~mbination."~~ The monopoly referred t o in Chase was obtained through Major League Baseball's infamous reserve system, initially introduced in 1887.94 The reserve system was implemented through a series of clauses in the Uniform Player Contract and the Major League Rules. The Major League Rules imposed several limits on the right of individual clubs to contract with players. These rules required individual clubs to use a uniform player contract and prohibited them from including a 89 Arthur Ashe noted that the civil rights movement was very active in pressuring the Major Leagues to take Black players. ASHE, supra note 61, at 9. But he also pointed out that the NAACP itself was generally silent when it came to baseball. Id. at 57-64.
Id. at 160. through the use of the reserve system.lo6 The Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore was a member of the Federal League which had competed with the American and National Leagues. The latter leagues bought out or induced every team in the Federal League except the Baltimore club to join them. The gist of the Baltimore club's antitrust claim was that the reserve system dried up the pool of skilled and talented players that the Baltimore club needed to compete.
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By this agreement players, before they could secure employment in any club operating under it, were required to enter into contracts which, it is alleged, gave the appellants control over practically all available players of sufficient skill to serve in a Major League club, and thus the Federal League was unable to secure players capable of producing such exhibitions of baseball as the public demanded; and, in consequence of this inability, disaster came upon the Federal League and its constituent clubs . . . .lo'
Similar claims were made nearly forty years later in Toolson u. New York Yankees."* The complaints in that case contained numerous allegations of the Major Leagues' control over the prices paid for players through salary caps and wage scales." The plaintiffs also alleged that Major League Baseball's monopoly extended beyond the player market to professional baseball in the United States. The complaints contained detailed allegations of territorial and broadcast restrictions. Moreover, the complaint in Corbett u. Chandler contained allegations about Major League Baseball's efforts to control and dominate the minor leagues by acquiring minor league clubs as farm teams of the Major League teams."' Branch Rickey pioneered the utilization of the White minor leagues as farm systems of the Major Leagues."' Players in those minor leagues were also subject t o the reserve system.'" A player signing a minor league contract was subject t o restraints like those of the Major Leaguers. However, White minor league teams developed players and made money by assigning the contract rights t o their stars to Major League teams. The minor leagues thus controlled the market for White log Toolson Record at 9-10,12-18. ' Major League Baseball's monopoly was so powerful that it was virtually impossible to own and operate a professional baseball team in the United States without the explicit or tacit consent of the Major Leagues. The Major Leagues not only directly dictated prices in the player market but controlled the entry of firms into the market. The implications of this extensive control on the Negro Leagues is obvious. They were able to exist or survive only with the consent of the Major Leagues. This reality for the Negro Leagues is only highlighted by the failure of the Major Leagues, the minor leagues, or many would-be entrants to recognize their existence before or after Jackie Robinson.
The plaintiff in Federal Baseball erroneously maintained that all professional baseball players in the United States were under the control of the Major Leagues. In all fairness, the Negro Leagues had not yet been formed at the time of the complaint, but there were Black professional players. The failure to acknowledge their existence continued in Toolson. The complaints filed in 1951 contained descriptions of the history of Organized Baseball in the United States but did not include a single reference to the Negro Leagues. The omission of the Negro Leagues in that history continued in Congressional proceedings. The Report of the 1958 antitrust hearings also contains a history of professional baseball without any reference to the Negro Leagues."' Despite the omission of the Negro Leagues in its then official history, Major League Baseball was very aware of their existence and its ability to determine their fate. There is evidence that the Major Leagues considered that the Negro Leagues would not simply die out if the Major Leagues signed Black players, but that the Major Leagues had the power to destroy them. The owner of the Washington Senators is reported t o have acknowledged as much in a meeting with two stars of the Negro Leagues. The comments seem to imply both the application of the integration premise and the recognition of the Major Leagues' monopoly position. The Major Leagues were wealthier and could outbid the Negro League teams. That only explains their acquisition of the stars; it does not explain their destruction of the Negro Leagues, which could only have been accomplished through the exercise of the monopoly power Major League Baseball had over the player market.
The death knell of the Negro Leagues thus appears to have sounded not from the loss of their stars, but from the use by the Major Leagues of its monopoly power. First, the Major Leagues subjected Black players t o its reserve system, allowing it to dictate their price. Black players who thereafter reached the majors were subject to the reserve system once they signed their first Major League contract. Jackie Robinson was not free to return to the Negro Leagues. Players were free, however, to return if the Major Leagues lost interest as they did with Satchel Paige. Integration thus meant that Negro League teams had to compete for players in the market for professional baseball players over which the Major Leagues maintained a monopoly. Second, in another exercise of monopoly power, the Major Leagues eventually circumvented the Negro Leagues by using their own scouting systems and signing Black players out of high school, thereby cutting off the Negro Leagues from the pool of potential talent as Third, after the Negro Leagues lost their imprimatur as a major league of baseball,'" they were precluded from operating as a minor league to develop the talent pool of young African-American players. Some teams did establish a relationship with Major League teams for a while as unofficial farm clubs.11s That function, however, was usurped by the Major Leagues with its use of the minor league farm system from which Black players had also been excluded. When the Major League teams started signing African-Americans out of high school, many of them, as did Jackie Robinson, signed minor league contracts first. The Negro Leagues were thus excluded from a possible niche as a developer (1991) .
lgl The American Football League precedent is applicable here as well, as it resorted to American Football League v. antitrust litigation which ultimately led to a merger. National Football League, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963 ).
An Antitrust Strategy
The Negro Leagues could have embarked upon a two pronged antitrust strategy. First, the exemption of baseball from the antitrust laws provided by Federal Baseball was not the exclusive province of the Major Leagues. It also applied to the Negro Leagues, notwithstanding the failure of the courts to acknowledge their existence. Accordingly, the Negro Leagues could have utilized the exemption to develop a reserve system so that they would strengthen their control over the market for Black professional baseball players. With a strong reserve system in the Negro Leagues, Branch Rickey could not have signed Jackie Robinson without negotiating with the Negro League owners, and they could have insisted upon a Federal League-type solution. They also may have been able to negotiate a reciprocal hands-off agreement similar to the compact reached by Commissioner Albert Chandler with the Mexican Leagues to honor the reserve systems of each other.'22
The affirmative use of the exemption would have had several drawbacks. A reserve system would have run counter to the culture of contractual freedom in African-American society. The owners would have encountered substantial criticism for pursuing their own greed at the expense of the players. Such criticism did appear when the Negro Leagues established a uniform player contract after the Kansas City Monarchs failed to receive compensation for Jackie Robinson. 123 The system would have required a stronger relational contract system than existed in the Negro Leagues. Not only would the Leagues have had t o enforce the system against players, but they also would have needed the power to keep team owners in line. As noted above, the owners frequently left the Leagues out of economic necessity. Moreover, they would have encountered considerable difficulty in enforcing the reserve system. The strategy would have required the availability of experienced commercial counsel, and such lawyers were scarce in African-American cornmunitie~. ' 
The Civil Rights Strategy
The Negro Leagues and its teams may have pursued a civil rights strategy. While history has recorded the NAACPs legal strategy t o desegregate public schools, little attention has been given to the effort to desegregate sports facilities in public parks, most notably golf courses. 
